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By Eva Bertram ’8 6 and Kenneth Sharpe

An alternative to the failed War on Drugs
his April, federal agents in
volved in Operation Zorro II
made a hugely successful drug
bust. They netted more than
six tons of cocaine and half a ton
marijuana— drugs with a wholesale
value of more than $100 million— and
charged 136 people involved in a Mex
ican-run trafficking network linked to
Colombian distributors. For some,
these dramatic seizures were proof
that America’s “war on drugs” was
working. But federal agents who
worked on the case questioned its
effect on price and availability. “I
doubt whether even the huge amount
of cocaine that was seized in this case
... would be much of a blip on the line
as far. as availability,” said Charles
Riley, chief of the FBI’s organized
crime/drug operations section.
At a time when U.S. spending on
federal drug control efforts is at an alltime high, the public record is pep
pered with similar frank admissions
by drug enforcem ent officials. There is
a curious irony here: Time and again,
U.S. officials acknowledge that drug
enforcem ent campaigns will have little
or no effect on the nation’s drug prob
lem— yet this recognition triggers an
escalation rather than réévaluation of
these campaigns.
For decades the central aim of
American drug policy has been to
eliminate all use of drugs such as
cocaine, heroin, and marijuana by
making the cost or risk of use pro
hibitively high. Using the threat of
punishment backed by force, the drug
war aims to make it more dangerous
and costly for growers, refiners, smug
glers, and dealers to produce and sell
drugs— thus driving down production
and availability, driving up prices, and
discouraging consum ers from buying
and using drugs. A secondary strategy
has been to raise the risk of use by
threatening users with jail or other
sanctions (such as loss of jobs, public
assistance, or licenses). Relatively lit
tle attention is given to treatm ent and
prevention.
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This approach to drug control is
not new. Most Americans trace the
current drug war to former President
Ronald Reagan and First Lady Nancy
Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaigns of
the early 1980s. But in fact America’s
war on»drugs was launched in the
1920s, when Treasury Department
agents charged with enforcing the
1914 Harrison Act took control of the
drug supply out of the hands of doc
tors and pharmacists and began the
effort to prohibit any sales or use. For
decades this policy punished smug
glers, dealers, and users as the
enforcement effort gradually grew.
A m ajor expansion of the drug
war— and the first presidential “decla
ration of war”— came during the
Nixon administration in 1970. The
next significant expansion cam e under
presidents Reagan and Bush in the
1980s. Since 1981, the U.S. has invest-

nstead of tilting at
windmills in the
struggle to chase
down and eliminate
the global drug trade,
we should approach
drugs as a public
health problem,
seeking to heal
rather than punish
drug abusers.

I

ed more than $65 billion in drug law
enforcement, and today the annual
budget for drug enforcement alone is
more than $8 billion.
But the results of this high-cost
drug-control campaign are dismal.
Despite seemingly impressive statis
tics on the rising numbers of acres of
drug crops eradicated, tons of cocaine
seized, and traffickers or dealers
jailed, levels of supply are as high as
ever. Coca production in Latin Ameri
ca has remained relatively stable.
There is no evidence of a decline in
the amount of drugs crossing U.S. bor
ders. And perhaps most important,
the prices for a gram of both pure
heroin and cocaine (as measured in
1994 dollars) have declined markedly
in the last 15 years— all in the face of
dramatic escalations in drug law
enforcement spending.
Nor has the drug war reduced drug
abuse and addiction. This failure is
sometimes obscured by the fact that
the number of so-called current
users— people who have taken drugs
within the past month— declined
between 1985 and 1993 from 22.3 mil
lion to 11.7 million. According to
White House reports, however, this
drop is explained largely by a decline
in casual marijuana use— a decline
that began in 1979, well before the
drug wars of the 1980s were under
way. Meanwhile the more serious
problems of abuse and addiction
involving cocaine and heroin (often
compounded by alcohol) are as bad
as or worse than ever. According to
the 1995 National Drug Control Strate
gy, the number of heroin addicts has
remained at about 600,000 for the last
S W A R T H M O R E C O L L E G E BULLETIN
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two decades, and there are indica
tions that it may be growing again.
Further, cocaine (and its derivative,
“crack”), which raised few-concerns in
the late 1970s, claimed at least 2.1 mil
lion hardcore addicts by 1993. Even
the intensive drug war assaults of the
mid- to late-1980s failed to reduce lev
els of cocaine or heroin abuse.
According to the government’s own
study, cocaine-related hospital emer
gencies increased by 22 percent
between 1988 and 1993, while heroinrelated emergencies rose 65 percent.

The Drug War Paradigm
Why do we continue to pursue the
same strategy of tough enforcement—
of chasing the drug supply and pun
ishing drug users— in the face of such
overwhelming evidence that the strat
egy is failing?
It’s tempting to search for a simple
explanation. Some blame presidential
drug warriors such as Richard Nixon
and Ronald Reagan for starting the
spiral of increasing drug enforcement
to further their law-and-order political
agendas. But this does not explain
why more m oderate presidents, such
as Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Bill
Clinton, have also perpetuated and
even escalated the war on drugs. Oth
AUGUST 1 9 9 6

ers point to partisan politics on Capi
tol Hill— and blame tough-on-crime
Republicans for using the drug issue
to drub the Democrats and gain votes.
But in fact the policy has been largely
bipartisan.
To really understand why the poli
cy has persisted we must look deeper.
We must confront the framework of
assumptions behind the drug war that
are (often unconsciously) shared by
many Americans. And we must see
how this paradigm operates politically.
The current policy is rooted in a
moralistic and punitive “drug-war
paradigm” that is accepted almost
reflexively by many Americans. It is
markedly different from the approach
to drugs among many Europeans,
Latin Americans, and others. And it
did not always guide conventional
wisdom or public policy in the United
States.
The assumptions of the drug-war
paradigm, created out of a series of

E va B ertram ’86 an d P rofessor o f P oliti
c a l S cien ce K enneth S h arp e a re co 
authors, with P eter A n dreas ’8 7 an d
M orris B lachm an , of Drug War Politics:
The Price of Denial, p u blish ed this sum 
m er by University o f C alifornia Press.

political struggles early in this centu
ry, have becom e almost common-sensical today. They hold that drug use is
morally wrong, that drug abuse and
addiction are the fault of misguided or
ignorant individuals, that drug-depen
dent people are criminals, that related
problems such as disease and crime
are caused primarily by drug-taking,
that the government should try to
stop all drug use as quickly as possi
ble, and that “getting tough” is the
only way to solve the problem.
These long-held assumptions have
set a highly intolerant and punitive
context for American drug-control pol
itics. Elected officials believe they
must out-tough each other to win
votes and public support for their
policies, and their political rhetoric, in
turn, further reinforces the punitive
paradigm. Efforts to institute alterna
tives— treatment, education, social
reform— are made to seem “soft.”
Such alternatives are underfunded or
dismissed and, when tried, they are
often undermined and distorted by
the punitive thinking of the drug war.
Politically powerful conservatives,
meanwhile, are able to sustain the key
symbols of the paradigm against chal
lengers, attacking and demeaning crit
ics and sidelining pragmatic alterna19

tives. Less zealous conservatives and
liberals, many of whom are skeptics
or closet critics of the drug war, have
been willing to go along or have cho
sen to remain silent.

Fundamental Questions
Understanding how this paradigm
fuels the cycle of escalation and fail
ure in the drug war helps focus atten
tion on what it will take to turn things
around. For policymakers to argue
that the current drug strategy needs
to be reevaluated and redirected
would be to concede defeat in the
moral crusade against drugs. Nor will
generating a list of solid policy alterna
tives do the trick. Given the current
punitive context, such alternatives
routinely fail to enter the debate.
What is needed is to ask the funda
mental questions: What kind of prob
lem is the drug problem? What are the
ends and means of drug control? What
are we trying to control and why?
And, given the character of the drug
problem, what are the limits of what
drug policy can achieve, and what is
likely to work? In short, what is need
ed is a new debate and a new politics
of drug control— one that, over time,
will replace the current paradigm with
a constructive alternative.
But what would an alternative
paradigm look like? The most widely
publicized is the free-market
approach to legalization proposed by
political libertarians, who define the
drug problem in terms of the damage
to individual freedom caused by the
prohibition policy. They hold the
notion of free choice as central.
Though legalization advocates recog
nize that drug-taking can lead to
addiction or to dangerous behavior,
they would leave the choice to indi
vidual adults who are presumed to be
responsible for any consequences to
them selves or others. The state, they
correctly emphasize, has done far
more harm than good in attempting to
control drug use.
The legalization approach captures
an important critique of the drug war.
Many of the problems attributed to
drug-taking— especially drug-related
crime— are in large part the conse
quence of the drug war policies them
selves. Just as prohibition of alcohol
in the 1920s created a violent and
criminal black market in liquor, so too
has drug prohibition produced the

espite billions
spent on la w
enforcement, the drug
supply is virtually
unchecked, and street
prices have fallen.
Yet critics of the policy
are accused of beinq

D

extraordinarily high prices and profits
of the drug trade. Criminal organiza
tions compete, often violently, for
these high profits, and those suffering
from drug addiction, particularly the
poor, are led to commit crimes to pay
the high prices. Ending prohibition,
say the legalizers, would lower the
price and the profits, and take much
of the crime out of the drug problem.
Within today’s punitive environ
ment, it’s not surprising that policy
makers— and many citizens— have a
hard time accepting this critique. The
idea that drug control policies are in
fact exacerbating some of the very
problems they seek to solve is too
counterintuitive and subtle a point to
penetrate the symbolically-charged
drug debate.
But there is another reason that the
legalization paradigm has not taken
deep root among the U.S. public. It
leaves unanswered the question of
what should be done about the harm
ful effects that drug addiction and
dangerous drug use have on individu
als and society. Some progressive
advocates of legalization argue for
adequate government services and
regulation in order to address the
health and other social effects of drug
use, but the legalization framework
itself does not provide adequate guid
ance to shape public judgement or
public policy on this issue.

A Public Health Alternative

From opium busts in the 1920s
(left) to the seizure of tons of
drugs in the 1980s (top left and
right), the federal government has
pursued a zero-tolerance
approach. Will politics prevent
the current “drug czar,” Gen.
Barry McCaffrey (above), from
making changes in U.S policy?

There is another alternative to the
punitive paradigm that is as radical as
it is simple: approach drugs as a pub
lic health rather than a crime prob
lem. Seeking health as the goal of drug
control would mean pursuing policies
that heal rather than punish drug
abuse and addiction. And it would
mean approaching the control of the
drug supply in terms of how best to
further public health, rather than tilt
ing at windmills in the struggle to
chase down and eliminate the globed
drug trade.
What would it mean to think of
drugs as a public health problem?
Start with reconceiving the drug user.
Caring for the health of people who
abuse drugs means minimizing the
harm they cause to themselves and
others and promoting their physical
and emotional well-being— not pun
ishing or threatening them. But a pub
lic health approach does not stop at

treating the individual physical or psy
chological problem of addiction. It
recognizes that drug use and abuse
have other effects— on families, neigh
borhoods, schools, and workplaces. A
public health strategy would seek to
minimize the harm a drug-dependent
person may do to his or her social
relationships. And it would minimize
the threat the drug user may pose to
the welfare of others, through policies
that discourage violence, dangerous
driving, irresponsible use of machin
ery in the workplace, and the spread
of diseases such as AIDS.
Such an approach confronts not
only the public effects of drug-taking,
but also the social factors that can
lead to drug-taking. There is always an
element of individual choice in drug
use and abuse, but experts in treating
drug addiction have long known that
choice is shaped and constrained by
social factors. A person whose family
and friends use drugs is more likely to
do so. Someone with a family, home,
and job who becom es addicted is bet
ter able to break an addiction than
someone without these social sup
ports. To treat drugs as a public
health problem is to recognize that
drug abuse and addiction are not sim
ply the result of an individual defect (a
weak will, a moral failing, a disease)
but also of the broader social environ
ment that is shaped in important ways
by other public policies.
It is by no means simple or easy to
confront the many social factors that
feed the cycle of drug abuse and its
harmful effects. But adopting this
framework as a starting point makes it
possible to reconceive the fundamen
tal purposes and policies of drug con
trol. The policy instruments— preven
tion, treatment, and law enforce
ment— may remain the same, but they
take on different meanings and
assume different priorities under a
public health paradigm.
Consider prevention. Under the
current punitive paradigm, prevention
tries to stop any and all use, and the
primary means is to scare or threaten
users. Thinking about prevention this
way excludes the possibility of
employing the public health principle
of preventing harm by teaching peo
ple safer drug use. Take the example
of designated driver programs that
aim to save lives by encouraging “des
ignated drivers.” For punitive preven-

“Just say no to drugs, ” urged First Lady
Nancy Reagan. But a person can say “n o ”
to drugs only if he has som ething to say
“y es” to. A public health approach would
aim to im prove the social and econom ic
environm ent that breeds drug abuse.
tion advocates, in the words of one
government publication: “materials
recommending a designated driver
should be rated unacceptable. They
encourage heavy alcohol use by
implying that it is okay to drink to
intoxication as long as you don’t
drive.”
Public health advocates may also
wish to minimize drunkenness, but
they are looking for ways to promote
public safety and reduce harm.
Instead of simply aiming at the impos
sible goal of “abstinence” or “no-intox
ication,” they realistically accept that
there will always be some use and
seek ways to save lives on the road.
This idea of promoting safe use—
not simply no use— also undergirds
public health efforts to stem the
spread of AIDS by preventing intra
venous heroin users from sharing
infected needles, one of the major
causes of the epidemic. Needleexchange programs, introduced in
parts of Europe and in som e U.S.
cities, encourage addicts to regularly
turn in their used and contaminated
needles in exchange for free sterile
22

ones. Yet despite the fact that welldocumented studies show that such
programs have succeeded in reducing
the rate of HIV infection by as much
as one third, they, like designated
driver programs, are opposed by
advocates of punitive prevention.
Many programs do not simply
exchange needles, but use the oppor
tunity to encourage addicts to seek
services such as drug treatment and
include educational programs on sani
tation and safe sex precautions. “Suc
c e ss” is not simply measured by absti
nence from drug use, but by the slow
down in the spread of AIDS and the
increase in the number of addicts who
seek treatment.
Yet conceiving prevention under
the punitive, prohibitionist paradigm
rules out such public health mea
sures. Today most states have laws
prohibiting addicts from possessing
injection equipment, and efforts to
permit needle exchange often face
fierce opposition. Robert Martinez,
drug czar under former President
George Bush, articulated the drug-war
paradigm’s assumptions when he
argued that distributing needles
“undercuts the credibility of society’s
message that drug use is illegal and
morally wrong....”
Consider also efforts to educate
young people about the dangers of
drugs. Under the punitive paradigm,
the focus of preventive education in
schools is scare tactics (the “feararousal” approach) and moral appeals
( “preaching” to students about the
evils of using drugs and exhorting
them to abstain). Evidence indicates
that such efforts do not work. In the
words of a 1990 congressional report,
“Putting forth the idea that all illegal
drugs are extremely dangerous and
addictive, when young people subse
quently learn otherwise through
experimentation, discredits the mes
sage.” Indeed the message often back
fires, encouraging experimentation.
Envisioning preventive education
in terms of public health would
change not only its content, but its
scope. It would aim to provide young
people with information on the physi
cal and psychological effects of all
psychoactive drugs (including alcohol
and other legal drugs)— as well as the
effects that drug-taking can have on
other things of value, such as work
and relations with friends and family.

Drug education for public health
would also teach safer use— even
while discouraging all use. Although
promoting safer use is contradictory
under a punitive paradigm that has
“zero tolerance” as its goal, no such
contradiction exists under a public
health paradigm.
Inevitably there will be some exper
imentation and casual drug use
despite the best efforts to discourage
it. And those unwilling to abstain or
unable to quit need to know which
drugs are more addictive, which com-
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Drug W a r Politics:
The Price of Denial
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A professor and
two former students
write a book together
sem inar style.

w
tf
A
c<

—

^ % e s e a r c h co lla b o ra tio n between
Im Sw arthm ore students and their fac
ulty mentors is nothing new, but writing
a book with a former professor several
years after graduation has to be a bit
unusual. Drug War Politics: The Price of
D enial was co-authored by Professor of
Political Science Kenneth Sharpe, his
longtime collaborator, Professor Morris
Blachman of the University of South
Carolina, and two Honors graduates in
Political Science, Eva Bertram ’86 and
Peter Andreas ’87.
Bertram and Andreas had worked
together before—not only as Swarthmore students, where they took a semi
nar together, but as Washington-based
policy analysts.
After graduation, each travelled in
South America. Andreas, thinking he
might become a journalist, worked at
The Nation and at Foreign Policy maga
zine, and is currently a research fellow
at the Brookings Institution. Bertram
worked with several national nonprofit
organizations seeking to influence U.S.
p o licy in C entral A m erica and to
address violations of law and human
rights in the region. Both are currently
writing doctoral dissertations, Andreas
in Government at Cornell and Bertram
in Political Science at Yale.
In 1990 and 1991, Andreas and Bert
ram found themselves working together
at the Institute for Policy Studies on
several projects related to drug policy.
They collaborated on a report of the
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binations of drugs are particularly
dangerous, how to prevent an over
dose and what to do in the event of an
overdose, what kinds of conditions
make drug use more or less danger
ous, and how to avoid dangerous
behaviors (such as unsafe sex or driv
ing) while in toxicated .
Treatment would also take on a dif
ferent meaning under a ppblic health
paradigm. Treatm ent under the drugwar paradigm is largely a supplement
to punishment. Both policy instru
ments have the sam e aim— to stop all

drug use. This means that those who
enter treatment but cannot kick the
habit— quickly and permanently—are
often abandoned. Some are offered
treatm ent under the threat of severe
punishment: you break your habit or
you will be sent to jail. For those
already in the criminal justice system,
treatm ent works alongside punish
ment— drug offenders are treated to
improve the deterrent value of prison,
in the hope that they will not commit
drug-related crimes upon release.
This approach to treatm ent is

reflected in budget battles in Washing
ton. “There’s still almost a moralistic
feeling,” explained Dr. Herbert Kleber,
a prominent drug official in the Bush
Administration, “that asks ‘Why
should we be putting tax dollars into
treating something that people have
brought on them selves?”’ Thus treat
ment providers are often forced to
justify their services as a crime-pre
vention tool. In part as a result, treat
ment always gets short shrift in bud
get allocations (treatment and preven
tion together account for about 30

House Committee on Governmental tics as “organic.” In many such books, Andreas “were able to bring a different
Operations on the drug war in the co-authors divide the topic into chap kind of experience to the process. Our
Andes. The congressional report was ters and independently write each sec work on Capitol Hill had given us a cer
widely circulated, and Andreas says tion. It’s often clear when you have tain sense of how people in Washing
that scholars and journalists in Latin p assed from one w rite r’s sty le to ton were thinking about this issue and
America were quick to point out its another’s, but the writing—and think of how policy was and wasn’t made.”
Their shared Swarthmore experi
conclusions: “‘Look,’ they would say, ing— in Drug W ar P olitics is virtually
en
ce,
says Andreas, also inform ed
seamless.
‘your own government’s report says
Bertram tells how they their analysis: “Swarthmore is a fertile
that this policy can’t work.’”
did it, sem inar style: “We environment for encouraging critical
A ndreas and B ertram
would
sit down around a thinking in a systematic way, for chal
passed the repprt along to
table and think through the lenging basic assumptions.”
Sharpe, who was then study
Sharpe adds that “scholarship at
argument together, brain
ing drug policy as a national
storming and testing differ Swarthmore is not a passive process—
security issue. For years his ^
ent ideas. Someone would you take on the big issues.” Drug War
research had been focused |
always be at the computer, Politics does just that, looking beyond
on politics and policy in Latin §
typing all th is up. W e’d the conventional wisdom on the issue
America. He and Blachman o
and examining why Congress and suc
develop som ething, then
had co-written numerous arti- g W
cessive administrations have not been
print
it
out,
read
it,
and
cles to g eth er, plus a 1986 f “
react to it at a deeper level.” able to act in a rational manner.
book, Confronting R evolution:
Can a book like this bring about a
Then, she says, one person
Security Through D iplom acy in
change
in policy? Andreas hopes that
would
take
on
the
task
of
Central A m erica. Sharpe’s two
drafting that particular sec it will be “a bridge-builder.... This isn’t
other books have also exam
tion, then hand it over to ju st an ad v ocacy book. T h e re ’s an
ined aspects of Latin Ameri
a n o th er m em ber of th e underlying analysis of the reasons for
can politics, from the influ
group to be rewritten. The these seemingly irrational policies. We
ence of multinational corpo
four co -a u th o rs sp en t try to show why there’s so much per
rations in Mexico to peasant
scores of hours together— sistence in the face of failure.”
movements in the Dominican
Sharpe, however, is not optimistic
mostly at an old cabin near
Republic. Andreas and Bert
about
the prospects for rapid change,
Sharpe’s
Vermont
summer
ram proposed th at Sharpe
home—editing and revising especially in today’s anti-crime envi
and Blachman work together
until a co m p lete b ook ronment. “Frankly, it’s discouraging,”
with them on drug policy.
he sighs. “The people who are actually
emerged.
The c o lla b o ra tio n th a t
Was there anything left of suffering the most—the people who
ensued, lastin g n early six
th e teach er-stu d en t rela are abusing drugs—are not politically
years before this, sum m er’s
tionship as they worked on active. And change will not come from
publication of the Drug W ar
the book? Maybe at first, a new president or one of the political
Politics, began with a winter
Bertram acknowledges, but parties becau se th ere are far m ore
1991-92 a rticle for F oreig n
“th e b rain sto rm in g and votes to be had by defining drug use as
Policy on the effects of the
writing p rocess created a a crim e and using it to prove your
drug war in South America.
lot of room for thinking out toughness. We think that the ‘front-lin
Buoyed by the success of this
e r s ’— th e treatm en t p ro fessio n als,
loud, for ch eck in g each
project, the four embarked
o th e r. And c o n sta n tly social workers, police, judges, public
on a m ore com p reh en siv e
rew riting each o th e r s ’ defenders, and community activists—
history and critiq u e of the
work-—that helped break will have to be the ones to raise their
politics of U.S. drug control.
voices for change.”
down some of that.”
Sharpe describes the pro
—Jeffrey Lott
Peter
Andreas
’87
She
feels
th
at
sh
e
and
cess of writing Drug War Poli
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percent of the drug-war budget).
The reasoning of most legislators is
simple: treatm ent might eventually
reduce use and ease crime, but in the
short term, wouldn’t it be m ore effec
tive just to lock such people up? And
given the characterization of people
who use or sell drugs as criminals,
punishment— not “care”— seem s
more appropriate. Naya Arbiter, a
therapy director in Tucson, explained:
“Once we make drug addicts into the
enemy, society has a tough time tak
ing them back in. Why would the pub
lic want to pay for more treatm ent if
they’re dealing with the enemy?”
Under a public health paradigm,
the aim of treatm ent would not be to
complement punitive policies in the
effort to suppress any and all use. In
fact, total abstinence— “full recov
ery”— is only one goal for public
health advocates. And for the majority
of addicts admitted to m ost drug pro
grams, an Institute of Medicine study
reported in 1990, abstinence is not
realistic. The aim of treatm ent is to
reduce the range and degree of harms
caused by use. It is not only to
“reduce drug consumption but also to
permit the responsible fulfillment of
family roles; to help raise employment
or educational levels; and to make the
client less miserable and more com

aring for the health
of drug users
means m inim izing the
harm they cause to
themselves and others.
W e need to under
stand that drug abuse
is not sim ply the
result of a w e a k w ill
o r a m oral failing.

fortable physically and mentally.”
Methadone maintenance, one of
the most successful treatment pro
grams for heroin addicts today, is
based on such public health goals.
Methadone, à synthetic opium deriva
tive that stops the craving for heroin
but lacks many of heroin’s deleterious
effects, is provided to addicts at clin
ics to help move them off heroin, into
treatment, and out of crime. Some
addicts eventually stop using both
m ethadone and heroin, but many con
tinue to take methadone for years and
are able to lead healthier, more satis
fying lives as parents, employees, and
m embers of the community.
But methadone treatment— origi
nally sold to the American public by
President Nixon as a crime-fighting
weapon— is continually under attack
by those who think of treatment in
term s of the punitive paradigm.
Attempts to expand methadone clin
ics in 1988, for example, met with
opposition by elected officials such as
Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.), thenchairman of the House Select Commit
tee on Narcotics. Rangel, who favored

treatment programs
designed to end drug use
entirely, derisively labeled
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ maintenance clinics “juice
bars.” He asked the Gener
al Accounting Office to review federal
ly-regulated methadone treatment
programs. Though the resulting
report criticized uneven practices, it
concluded that this form of treatment
offered substantial benefits. Rangel
chose to ignore this evidence and con
tinued his attack. Such opposition is
rooted in punitive assumptions— i.e.
since methadone consumption is drug
use, and drug use is wrong, it must be
eliminated.
The approach to pregnant drug
using women under the two
paradigms provides a further exam
ple. Drug-dependent pregnant women
may give birth to newborns afflicted
with fetal-cocaine syndrome or other
health problems. Operating under
punitive assumptions, legislators in a
number of states have responded
with threats to punish these women in
order to discourage their drug use.
Some states criminalize women who
use drugs during pregnancy. Some
allow newborns who test positively
for drugs (and their siblings) to be
taken from their mothers and placed
in state custody. But from a public
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N eedle exchange programs (far left) are
often opposed on the grounds that they
encourage drug use, yet they are known to
reduce the rate o f HIV infection am ong
intravenous drug users. Drug raids clog
courts and prisons with drug offenders. In
1993, 61 percent o f all federal prisoners
w ere incarcerated because o f drug crimes.
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Conclusion
Developing a new approach to drugs
in America is, of course, more than an
intellectual exercise. The current
punitive, drug war paradigm took hold
as a result of years of political strug
gle— and reform will only com e about
through similar struggles.
Such struggles, our research
shows, are unlikely to be led by politi
cians locked in a competition to outtough each other. They may, however,
be led by those on the front lines of
today’s drug war, people who have
firsthand experience of its failure.
Judges cannot dispense justice
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health perspective, such punitive
measures seriously undermine the
prospects for treatment. Fearing pun
ishment and afraid to lose their chil
dren, many mothers choose not to
seek drug treatm ent or the prenatal
care that could dramatically improve
the life chances of their children.
Perhaps most important, treatment
under public health rejects the almost
exclusive focus on the individual drug
user emphasized by the punitive
paradigm and insists on also doing
something about the social environ
ment that shapes the choices of those
who abuse drugs. Particularly for sub
stance abusers who are poor, home
less, or jobless, drug use is often seen
as a “solution” to other problems that
need fixing in their lives.
Without a “social stake,” argues
Thelma Brown of the Watts Health
Foundation, treatm ent cannot suc
ceed: “One of the highest causes of
recidivism occurs when a client leaves
treatment. He or she is likely to be
forced to return to the very sam e envi
ronment that contributed to the
addiction in the first place. What
awaits this individual is lack of
employment— and the old cycle of
hopelessness and h elp lessn ess.. . .
Upon completion of these [treatment]
programs, provisions should be made

for follow-through, such as providing
jobs, training and ed u cation .. . . One
can say ‘no’ to drugs, but we must
provide something to which one can
say ‘yes.’”
A public health approach would
not only redefine treatment and pre
vention, but also law enforcement
policies. Under a public health
paradigm, those who committed
crimes or injured others under the
influence of drugs would certainly be
punished. But criminalizing drug
users because they have a health
problem would seem as misguided as
jailing heavy drinkers and alcoholics.
Given the aim to heal rather than pun
ish those suffering from drug prob
lems, a public health approach would
decriminalize drug use and instead
seek ways to draw users into the
health care system.
Public health would also demand
some regulation of the supply of dan
gerous drugs. Simply legalizing drugs
such as cocaine and heroin would
make them as readily and cheaply
available as alcohol and tobacco, and
market greed and competition would
lead to continued wide-scale use and
active promotion. Controlling supply,
however, would only be one aspect of
a public health agenda, not the prima
ry, overriding feature it is in today’s
punitive paradigm; prevention and
treatment would have primacy.

because their courts are clogged with
drug cases. Police charged with elimi
nating drug dealers find that there is
an endless supply of new dealers to
take the place of those arrested.
Providers of drug treatment cannot
secure sufficient funds to keep their
offices open—yet more and more peo
ple are knocking on their doors, seek
ing help. Local communities are pay
ing more in tax dollars, but drug
abuse and violence continue unabat
ed in many neighborhoods.
These contradictions constitute
fault lines in the current drug-control
system. Modest struggles for change
are underway along these cracks, but
they are unlikely to succeed in isola
tion. Drug problems and their policy
solutions are too much a part of deep
er social issues and struggles— over
health care, urban decay, racism, and
econom ic underdevelopment in our
cities. But if such struggles are to cre
ate the possibility for reform aimed at
public health, concerned citizens and
front liners with practical experience
in treatment, prevention, and criminal
justice will have an invaluable role to
play in charting a new politics of drug
control. ■

At 13, this Louisiana girl is involved in the
fight against drugs. But if she or som eone
she loves does take drugs, will treatment or
punishment be a better solution?

